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26 March 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with Mr. Vance and Dr. McMillan on
Thursday, 25 March

1. Upon reading Mr. Bross' memorandum for record of his discussion with Secretary Vance on 24 March [redacted] 25X1
it was apparent to me that Secretary Vance had been fed a lot of misinformation by Dr. McMillan on the hassle that McMillan and I were engaged in in connection with CORONA operations on the West Coast (see my memorandum of telephone conversation with Dr. McMillan conducted at about 6:00 p.m., 24 March). I immediately telephoned Vance's office and asked for an appointment as soon as possible. I subsequently met with Dr. Wheelon, [redacted] 25X1
and others who felt it was essential that I meet with Vance in order to straighten him out since, in his present frame of mind based on McMillan's innuendoes or worse, it might have a bearing on overall discussions on the NRO agreement. I subsequently talked to Mr. McCone who likewise felt the matter was urgent and telephoned Secretary Vance, urging an appointment for me immediately.


2. I met with Secretary Vance in his office at about 1:30. Mr. Vance read in toto my memorandum for record of my conversation with McMillan. He stated that, up until reading that memorandum, he had the distinct impression that the matter was simply one of CIA withholding from the Air Force satellite people information that the latter needed in order to conduct launch and recovery. I then told him exactly how the calibration data and telemetry charts were developed during manufacture and checkout of the payload and how the operation was conducted at the AP facility during flight. I assured him that all information on the condition and operation of the payload and the payload section of the vehicle which could in any way affect the health of the vehicle or bear on the decision to de-orbit was

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Greer himself was really a party to them. I said if he wanted names of the trouble makers, I would give them to him and it was perfectly apparent to me that there was a clear-cut effort to run CIA out of the satellite business and make this critical intelligence collection system a complete blue-suit operation. About this time Secretary Vance telephoned McMillan and informed him of his agreement in the message I had read to him. McMillan was docile and uncommunicative to Vance. He then attempted to reopen with me the entire matter to include acquisition of all the basic telemetry and calibration data. I told him he could not have it, that his people would not know what to do with it, that I had no intention of establishing or allowing to be established a separate diagnostic, analytical function by an agency having no responsibility for the payload. Dr. McMillan dropped that subject by stating that this was a matter which would have to be settled in a different arena and that he would not press that point now, since he had a satellite waiting for his approval to launch. At this point I suggested that any delay in launch for other than technical reasons would be a most serious matter to the entire intelligence community and especially Mr. McCone who had been told that the satellite would be launched in a few hours. McMillan then said that the people at STC did not even get the results of telemetry analysis (as claimed by Maxie's memorandum) and I stated that this was untrue. I again reiterated that STC got every piece of information necessary for them to perform their function and that any results of the telemetry analysis which could have any bearing on STC operations was made available immediately and, where necessary, in specific detail. McMillan said it was just as important for STC to know whether everything was normal as to know of any abnormality. I told him this information had always been furnished to the STC. McMillan asked me if I would include in the message a statement indicating that the results of payload telemetry analysis would be quantitatively and in detail provided the STC. I ignored his exact phraseology and said I saw no reason why the results of the analysis should be made available as appropriate but that before including it in the cable, I would want to check it with my staff. McMillan said, "I get the impression that McCone and you are captives of your staff and unable to make decisions." I told McMillan

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that he would do well to learn how to use a staff himself as well as exerting some caution in his use of the English language. I told him I would let his last comment pass since it was apparent he was most discomfited by Mr. Vance's decision. His final statement was that the matter of whether or not other people had access to the technical telemetry data and calibration charts was a matter for further action in the future.

4. I then returned, discussed McMillan's request with the DD/S&T people, and dictated [redacted] which the DD/S&T folks concurred in.

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5. I want especially to be alerted to any action that McMillan, General Martin, or others may take which in any way would reflect on [redacted] or Colonel Conway or Colonel Heran who, so far as I can make out, are acting like good, national-interest citizens and doing the job they should be doing. You may rest assured that while we have clearly won this skirmish, the battle will continue so long as McMillan, Martin, Worthman, Bussard, and Murphy are in the act.

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Marshall S. Carter
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy Director

MSC:blp

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